If Southern state rights senators and representatives could have had their way entirely, they would have written into the KansasNebraska Act and into every other territorial measure a declaration of the validity of the common-property doctrine and a requirement that the territorial courts and legislatures afford slaveowners due protection in their property. Such a provision, if enforced in the territories, for, say, ten or twenty years, might well have resulted in several of them developing into slave states. The common-property doctrine was no mere abstraction. As has been true with many constitutional contentions, it had no doubt been invented because of the practical advantages that might follow its application.3 Strongly proslavery people had been striving to get new slave states into the Union so as to maintain strength enough in the United States Senate to ward off the passage of legislation inimical to the peculiar institution.
Southern Jacksonian Democrats, of whom there were still many left, especially in the Upper South, did not accept the commonproperty doctrine. But such had been the shifts and fortunes of politics in recent years that of the large Democratic delegation in the Thirty-Third Congress only one senator, Sam Houston of Texas, was a Jacksonian, and only one representative, Thomas Hart Benton, now in the House after thirty years in the Senate, can be clearly recognized as belonging to that faction. Of thirteen Southern Whig senators at least three, Archibald Dixon of Kentucky, Robert Toombs of Georgia, and John M. Clayton of Delaware, held constitutional views difficult to distinguish from those of the state rights Democrats, and of the twenty-three Southern Whig representatives at least one, John R. Franklin of Maryland, was of the same persuasion. 4 Not one Northern senator or representative who spoke on the Kansas-Nebraska bill accepted the common-property doctrine or was willing to write it into a piece of legislation. All but a few from the North took the position that Congress had the power to legislate for the territories in all matters and accordingly to torical Society, Journal, LIV (Summer 1961), 117-80, and also published separately. 3 The doctrine had first been clearly stated by Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina in the House of Representatives, January 5, 1847; and John C. Calhoun had presented it in a set of resolutions in the Senate, February 19, 1847. Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., app., 244-46, 455.
4 So was Thomas L. Clingman of North Carolina who had long been a Whig but now claimed to belong to no party. Ibid., 33 Cong., 1 Sess., app., 489. The party affiliations in the Thirty-Third Congress are taken from ibid., 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 1-2.
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delegate to a territorial legislature the power to legislate on slavery and other rightful subjects of legislation.5 Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan was one of the exceptions. He argued with much learning that Congress had no power whatever to legislate for the territories in matters of local concern except to give each a frame of government and start it on its way.6 A few other Northern Democrats in Congress, of whom Douglas was not then one, agreed with Cass.7 All that Cass's view and the common-property doctrine had in common was that according to each the slavery prohibition of the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional; they differed widely in supporting reasoning. Senator Salmon P. Chase of Ohio presented but did not press the idea, later popular with the new Republican party, that it would be a violation of the due-process-of-law clause of the Fifth Amendment for the federal government to permit slavery in any of the territories.8
The large majority of Southern Whigs agreed with the great majority in the North in their view as to the constitutional powers of Congress over slavery in the territories, although they agreed with their state rights colleagues in wanting the Missouri Compromise repealed and the territories opened to slavery.
Next to congressional acceptance and implementation of the common-property doctrine the state rights people wanted most the repeal of the slavery restriction in the Missouri Compromise; and in wanting this they were joined by nearly all other Southerners. The debates on the Kansas-Nebraska bill make it starkly clear that a principal reason Southerners wanted the restriction repealed was that they had come to regard it as an insult and a reproach to their section, a stigma implanted on their institutions by an act of the Congress of their own country. Southerners' denunciations of the Missouri restriction in 1854 were as bitter as their denunciations of the Wilmot Proviso had been in its time. Senator Andrew P. Butler of South Carolina termed it "a festering thorn" in "the side of the South."9 Senator David R. Missouri called it "infamous"''0 and Representative Philip Phillips of Alabama, a "miserable line, containing as it does a congressional imputation against one half the states."" Some Northerners could understand the Southern feeling. Cass said that if he were a Southerner he would regard the restriction as "invidious." "And certainly to remove this bar sinister from the national escutcheon," he continued, "may well furnish a more powerful motive of action to a great community jealous of its honor, than any hope or expectation that its accomplishment will lead to the introduction of slavery into these territories."'12 Senator Truman Smith of Connecticut, who made the most powerful speech against repeal, said, "We know that legislation like the act of 1820 has ever been to them a stumbling block and an offense." '13 Those Northern senators and representatives who opposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise restriction or its weakening in any way also made its proposed repeal a matter of conscience but in the opposite way. Slavery was such a violation of the rights of man, they said, such a moral and social evil, that they could not in good conscience vote to permit it to enter or even vote to give it indirectly a chance to enter a territory in which it was not already established. They further said that slavery was so degrading to the dignity of labor that, if slaves should be taken into the territory, even in comparatively small numbers, free workers from the North and immigrants from Europe would shun it and in effect be excluded.14 The "Appeal of the Independent Democrats" asserted that opening the territory to slavery would "exclude from a vast unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free laborers from our own States, and convert it into a dreary region of despotism inhabited by masters and slaves."''5 Of the many Northern members of Congress who for the sake of 10 Ibid., 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 1303. 11 Ibid., app., 533. 12 Ibid., 278. 13 Ibid., 173. 14 Ibid., 155, 162, 262-70. In a long teaching career in Northern colleges I have presented the substance of this and the preceding paragraph to thousands of students. A rough estimate is that half understood how it might be a matter of conscience with many congressmen to vote to exclude slavery from the territories and one in ten could believe that Southern congressmen might regard exclusion by law as an insult and a reproach and understand how and why they could do so. Yet no one who can not understand both of these conflicting attitudes and the reasons why people maintained them can understand the causes of secession and civil war. national and party harmony were willing to make concessions to the South, not one was willing to vote for any provision of law that would directly establish or protect slavery in a territory.
The legislative history of the Kansas-Nebraska Act may be characterized briefly as the territorial aspects of the great congressional slavery struggle of 1846-1850 all over again, but compressed into five months and with most of the bargaining and compromising done in closed committee meetings, conferences of leaders, and caucuses instead of on the floors of the Senate and House, as had been true of the Compromise of 1850.
On December 14, 1853, early in the first session of the ThirtyThird Congress, Augustus C. Dodge of Iowa introduced a bill in the Senate to organize a territory of Nebraska embracing all of the then unorganized territory of the United States lying between the parallels of 360 30' and 430 30' north latitude.'6 The bill made no mention of slavery, and it was assumed that if enacted it would leave the slavery prohibition of the Missouri Enabling Act in force. Dodge's bill was properly referred to the Committee on Territories, of which Douglas was chairman.
On January 4, 1854, Douglas on behalf of the committee reported the Dodge bill back to the Senate with important amendments and submitted a committee report which explained provisions likely to be controversial and gave or purported to give the reasons why the committee had included those provisions.17 One amendment pushed the northern boundary of the proposed territory up to the forty-ninth parallel, the national boundary. Other amendments gave the bill provisions with regard to slavery that were all but identical with those of the Utah and New Mexico acts of 1850, provisions which, in those acts, embodied a very significant part of the Compromise of 1850.18 Putting these provisions in the Nebraska bill, of course, represented considerable concessions to the South.
The most significant slavery provision of this first version of the committee Nebraska bill was as follows: "The legislative power of the territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act . . . ." A few matters were excluded from 16 For a description of the Dodge bill, see Congressional Globe, 33 A third slavery provision in the committee Nebraska bill, copied verbatim from the Utah and New Mexico acts, was designed to insure that any sort of court case that might arise in the proposed territory "involving title to slaves" or "any writ of habeas corpus, involving the question of personal freedom" might be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States; the stock judiciary provision in earlier territorial acts did not insure that a slave case, even though it might involve a constitutional issue, could go any higher than the supreme court of the territory in which it might arise. The more careful appeals provision had been put in the At any rate, on January 23, and still before debate on the bill had formally begun, Douglas on behalf of the Committee on Territories reported a substitute for its first bill that was distinctly more favorable to the proslavery views. The substitute would create two territories (instead of one) in the Nebraska region, one, Kansas, lying between the thirty-seventh and fortieth parallels, the other, Nebraska, extending from the fortieth parallel to the forty-ninth. Except for the names and boundaries, the slavery and other provisions relating to the one territory were identical with those for the other. The substitute retained intact, for each of the proposed territories, the slavery provisions already described, including squatter sovereignty. But a new provision stated that the eighth section of the Missouri Enabling Act "was superseded by the principles of the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, and is declared inoperative."28 26 Congressional Globe, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 175. 27 Ibid., app., 221. 28 For a description of the substitute, see ibid., 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 222.
The inclusion of the provision declaring the Missouri Compromise inoperative was a great concession to the sensibilities of Southern people and an added shock to those of antislavery folk. But with squatter sovereignty left intact, it is highly questionable that the virtual repeal of the Missouri Compromise would in actual practice increase the likelihood that Kansas and Nebraska or the one or the other would become slaveholding. Under the original committee bill, had it been enacted, a slaveowner presumably would have been afraid to migrate into either territory and take slaves along until and unless the territorial legislature first legalized slavery, for otherwise territorial judges might set their slaves free under the eighth section of the Missouri Act. People from the free states, presumably hostile to slavery, and nonslaveholders from slave states, who might prove also to be opposed to the establishment of the institution, would not be taking such property risks in coming to the territory and would, therefore, be less likely to be deterred from coming. This difference in risks would militate against the legalization of slavery by the very important first legislature or by any subsequent one. Under the committee substitute, if it should be enacted, slaveowners might well be just as hesitant about moving into the territory with their property until and unless the legislature should have first legalized slavery; for until then they could have little assurance that the territorial legislature would not prohibit slavery when it should come to act on the subject or that meanwhile the judges would protect them in their property in the absence of any statute law on the subject-as the majority in Congress certainly assumed would be the case. Indeed, the judges might even enforce the common law principle that slavery can not exist where there is no statute positively establishing it. In short, squatter sovereignty with the Missouri Compromise repealed would have about the same practical result as squatter sovereignty without repeal. In either case squatter sovereignty would weight the scales considerably in favor of freedom. However, the creation of the two territories instead of one, as proposed in the first committee bill, whether designed for that purpose or not, would greatly improve the chances that the South would eventually get another slave state. The proposed Territory of Kansas would lie directly west of Missouri, and it might well be that people friendly to slavery would move into the new territory from that state in sufficient numbers to dominate the early legislatures and get slavery firmly established. But, if the district lying west of Mis- Even after the caucus agreement, in both houses state rights members continued to expound their common-property doctrine at every turn. Their objects probably were to try to persuade themselves and the public that the Missouri Compromise was being repealed because a majority in Congress believed it to be unconstitutional-which was not so-and to influence the thinking of Supreme Court justices against the day of decision.
There was naturally some speculation in the course of the struggle as to how the Supreme Court would decide when and if a case involving the constitutional issue should come before it. A few on each side expressed misgivings.37 But the remarkable thing is how confident most members seemed to be that the Court would sustain their particular views. Neither faction or group tried to exact a pledge from the others to abide by the expected decision. A few members declared that the bill would pledge Congress to accept the decision whatever it might be, and a few promised to abide by it.38
The opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska bill employed as their chief talking point the contention that the substitution for the Missouri Compromise of another settlement of the slavery question was a gross violation of a "sacred" sectional compact. According to that compact, ran the argument, the North was to consent to Missouri it contained the stock governmental provisions making the territorial governor, secretary, and principal judges appointive by the President, giving the governor an absolute veto of bills passed by the legislature, requiring that the laws enacted be reported to Congress, and stipulating that legislation disapproved by Congress would be null and void.42 The supporters of the bill met these sallies in silence for the most part. But they did finally amend the bill by giving the Kansas and Nebraska legislatures power to override governors' vetoes by a two-thirds majority and by striking out the requirement that laws passed by the legislatures be submitted to Congress.43 Pettit explained that, while Congress could not divest itself of the power to disallow territorial laws, the amendment would "show . . . what our intention is." 44 To state rights Democrats and some of the Southern Whigs, squatter sovereignty was a bitter pill, for reasons already explained. When they were called upon by opponents of the KansasNebraska bill to explain how they could support a measure containing a feature so distasteful to them, they replied variously: The territorial legislatures would recognize their constitutional duty and provide for the protection of slave property (even though Congress was not meeting its obligation!). If the legislatures should fail to meet their constitutional obligation, surely the territorial courts would meet theirs. The bill would give the South a "chance" to get a new slave state. If it would accomplish nothing but the removal of the intolerable stigma of the eighth section of the Missouri Enabling Act, it would be justified.45 "Our honor is saved," said Senator James M. Mason of Virginia. "Nothing is saved but our honor; and yet we agree to it."46 After all, said some, we can not press the Northern Democrats too far lest we disrupt the party and endanger the Union. A number of state rights men who were supporting the bill simply refused, in the face of all the evidence, to recognize openly that squatter sovereignty was in it. ., 289, 239, 292, 228-32, 299, 776, 286 sion into two territories had been made originally for the one purpose or the other or for both we may never know for certain. However, we are certain that every senator and representative understood that the division of the original Nebraska into two would greatly increase the likelihood that the South would get a new slave territory subsequently to become a new slave state; and we can be reasonably certain that, whether a bargain had been made in the first place or not, the friends of the bill who met in the caucuses and conferences at least agreed to support the proposed division. For, when Chase proposed in the Senate to amend the bill by combining the two proposed territories into one, every Southern senator present and every Northern senator present who later voted for the bill voted to retain the division; and every Northern senator present (with two exceptions) who later voted against the bill voted to combine. When a similar amendment was proposed in the House, the totals against and for the amendment on a voice vote were so close to the totals for and against the bill on its final passage that it is reasonable to conclude that practically all the friends of the bill had voted to retain provision for two territories and practically all the opponents had voted for only one. In the Senate the final division on the Kansas-Nebraska bill, counting all who were paired and all who were absent but later indicated how they would have voted had they been present, was 41 to 17. Northern Democrats voted 15 for the bill, 5 against it; Southern Democrats, 15 for to 1 against. Northern Whigs voted none for, 7 against; Southern Whigs voted 11 for, 2 against. The two Free Soilers, of course, voted "Nay." The lone Southern Dem- 56 The slavery provisions of the Kansas-Nebraska bill were not the work of any one man or clique. They were a compromise, hammered out with great difficulty in committee, conferences, and caucuses and on the Senate floor, between a majority of the Northern Democratic senators and representatives on the one hand and nearly all the Southern senators and representatives, both Democratic and Whig, on the other. Although quite similar to the slavery provisions of the Utah and New Mexico Acts of 1850, the provisions of the Kansas-Nebraska Act included two new concessions to Southern sensibilities, principles, and interests. They abrogated the slavery prohibition of the Missouri Compromise, whereas the Utah and New Mexico acts did not abrogate
